Introduction
Maurice Merleau-Ponty is known as the philosopher of the body and embodiment, and almost any study, analysis or theory dealing with these topics has traces of his influence. His radical reframing of embodiment has been deeply formative of contemporary philosophical and critical thought about perception and cognition, which challenges Cartesian and neo-Cartesian notions of vision and mind (e.g. Varela et al., 1991; Gallagher, 2005) . Merleau-Ponty is not, however, a philosopher who is spontaneously thought of in the context of science and technology studies. He is largely absent from efforts by a growing number of scholars in science studies and related fields to develop new approaches to ontology that, to an increasing extent, account for both knowledge and being in terms invoking process, networked agency, and performativity (e.g. Stengers, 2000; Mol, 2002; Latour, 2005; Barad, 2007; Coole and Frost, 2010; Dolphijn and van der Tuin, 2012; Braidotti, 2013) . These efforts often go together with a renewed interest in the instrumentation of science and the roles played by symbolisms and tools, which are no longer thought of as external to being but as integral to processes of becoming (Simondon, 1958; Stiegler, 1994 Stiegler, , 1996 Stiegler, , 2001 ). This article aims to bring Merleau-Ponty into these conversations.
We focus in particular on his later work, and on his reframing of the body through the notion of ÔMerleau-PontyÕs final ontology of the flesh, with its postulation of a fundamental indifference between body and world, requires a technics --a theory of the originary technicity of the humanÕ (Hansen 2006: ix) . However, whereas Hansen claims that the technical dimension of embodiment is missing in Merleau-PontyÕs work and seeks to catalyse this dimension by engaging with digital media art and other philosophers, we aim to show that there are also resources to conceptualise this dimension in Merleau-PontyÕs own work. 5 This article contributes to the ongoing work of reformulating ontology and understanding the technical dimension of embodiment by developing an approach that reconsiders some of Merleau-PontyÕs key ideas regarding the expressive and revealing capacities of the perceiving body, with particular emphasis on the formative and transformative capacities of tools, symbolic systems, and other cultural forms of expression 6 . While his own distinction between the body and technologies at some points led to an impasse and a failure fully to realise the potential of his own resources, we exploit these resources by going further in the direction sketched out in extremely suggestive and thought-provoking texts, notes and passages found in his later work, Forthcoming in Theory, Culture and Society 4 taking Merleau-Ponty beyond himself. Our intervention focuses on a cluster of ideas revolving around the body as a standard or measure of things, which in The Visible and the Invisible (1968 Invisible ( [1964 ) and Nature (2003 [1995] ) 7 were worked out within the framework of Merleau-PontyÕs expansive notion of flesh (to be explained below). Taking our inspiration from some key quotes in these and other works, we develop a conceptual tool that we will refer to as the Ômeasuring bodyÕ 8 . In this context, ÔmeasuringÕ and related terms such as ÔmeasureÕ and ÔmeasurementÕ are conceived more broadly than their strictly quantitative meaning. Indeed, in the quotes that inspired this article, Merleau-Ponty treats ÔmeasurementÕ as an ontological concept that concerns the inner scaffolding of the existential field, the Ôinvisible armatureÕ of the perceived (MerleauPonty, 2003: 224) . These passages all emphasize the complicity and reversibility between measuring agencies and measured phenomena 9 . As a Ômeasure of beingÕ (Merleau-Ponty, 1973: 124) , the perceiving body is seen as mutually intertwined or entangled with the phenomena it targets, bodies and environments co-shaping each other in ongoing processes of differentiation.
While Merleau-Ponty did not himself use the term Ômeasuring bodyÕ in this exact wording, we hope to show that the possibility of this further development offers itself at many points in his published and unpublished works. The advantage of this new conceptual tool is that it neither privileges nor coincides with sensory perception. It acknowledges that technoscientific interrogations of the world involve distributed and displaced agencies of observation that engage in a two-way formative exchange between observer and observed --challenging pre-conceived dualisms between bodies and environments, humans and nonhumans. work --converging on the notion of flesh --emphasizes instead an expansive and expressive dynamic that does not stop at sensory perception but extends into and comprises intellectual life (Saint Aubert, 2008: 10, 14) . This is precisely the point where we make our intervention. The aim of this article is to explore and further elaborate upon the expansive notion of flesh, outlining an approach that, to an even larger extent than does the later Merleau-Ponty, emphasizes the mediated nature of knowledge and being, by more radically integrating mediating artefacts into the perceptual/conceptual complex. This implies granting a relative agency and autonomy to symbolisms and tools, whose ÔnonhumanÕ modes of operation 13 serve to decentre and displace the interrogating capacities of the perceiving body in productive ways. By thus further accentuating the expansive dynamic of the flesh, the proposed approach reconfigures the perceiving body into a symbolically and technologically distributed measuring body. This reconfiguration calls attention to the ontological import of symbolisms and tools, which, each in their own way, operate as Ômeasures of beingÕ (Merleau-Ponty, 1973: 124) .
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Flesh and the Body as Standard or Measure
In his later work, Merleau-Ponty continues his critical engagement with the Cartesian legacy, which is now supplemented by a critical engagement with the thinking of Jean-Paul Sartre. He reproaches the latter for a disjunction between subjects and objects, brought about by his sharp distinction between the Ôin-itselfÕ and the Ôfor-itselfÕ. Sartre, Merleau-Ponty maintains, conceives subjectivity as holding being in front of itself as a spectacle and, hence, as not operating Ôfrom the middle of thingsÕ (Merleau-Ponty, 2008: 48, our translation) . This contrasts with MerleauPontyÕs project, which explores the in-betweenness, the lived relations in which we are embedded. There is also a further and deeper sense in which Sartre, in Merleau-PontyÕs view, fails to start from the middle of things. SartreÕs conception of human beings as free remains bound up in the distinction between the for-itself and the in-itself. Thus, human beings can only be free at the cost of the lack of freedom of natural objects. Again this contrasts with MerleauPontyÕs approach, according to which nature offers resistance to the operation of free subjectivity (2008: 53) . There is a depth in being that is lost in SartreÕs account, since, by conceiving the foritself (consciousness) as a mere negation of the in-itself, it fails to address the productive negativity in being and from which being is born. It is precisely this notion of a productive and working negativity in being 14 that Merleau-Ponty is getting at when he coined the term ÔfleshÕ.
Merleau-PontyÕs main objection to SartreÕs philosophy of subjectivity, and to the Cartesian tradition more generally, is that these approaches fail to ascribe an appropriate role to the perceiving body. What sets Merleau-PontyÕs ontological exploration apart, is that it accords the perceiving body a non-trivial ontological role, invoking a notion of corporality that is not the . This, then, is why the measuring body is a promising starting point for addressing the difficult question about how to overcome the divide between the intelligible and the sensible worlds.
Key Concepts for a Dynamic Reformulation of Ontology
The idea of the body as a standard or measure forms part of Merleau-PontyÕs broader ontological project. In this section we discuss some of the key concepts in Merleau-PontyÕs endeavour to ontologically reframe perception, which at the same time allow us to further develop the notion of the measuring body. All of these concepts emphasize the mutual intertwining and entanglement of the seen and the seeing, of the measured and the standard of measurement, each concept adding another nuance to the articulation of a carnal, integrated and dynamic ontology.
Environment (Umwelt)
A central concern of Merleau-PontyÕs philosophy of the flesh is the attempt to develop an alternative to substantivist ontologies and mechanistic ways of thinking about causation. In this, he found support in the biological theory of his time, where he took a particular interest in those biologists who offered alternatives to mechanistic causal accounts of animal behaviour, such as UexkŸll accounted for biological processes in terms of meaningful behaviour, and therefore as always oriented towards something in a targeted way, rather than mechanistically caused.
Depending on their structure, different kinds of organisms address different aspects of the physical world, which means that even if they live in the same physical locality, they live in different ÔenvironmentsÕ in UexkŸllÕs specific meaning of the term. For UexkŸll, the environment of an organism is constituted through the range of possible interactions between organism and the physical world. However, in contrast to Ôlower animalsÕ, which, according to UexkŸll, are not reliant, for their behaviour, on feedback from the physical world (one example given is the amoeba), Ôhigher animalsÕ are characterized by the way that they respond to stimuli with fine-grained actions that are not determined in advance, neither by the structure of the organism nor by the structure of the physical world 22 . For these animals, the environment is an opening onto an existential field of possible perceptions and actions, which is to say that the organism relates to the world as a transformer rather than as a mere receptor. For Merleau-Ponty, the philosophical attraction of UexkŸllÕs notion of environment is that it is Ôdestined to join what it is to organize a milieu starting from a central reference point that cannot itself be referred to without losing its original meaningÕ (Canguilhem, 2001: 21 Instead of causal relations, it opens the possibility of thinking in terms of behaviour and meaning, that is, in terms of organisms that are oriented toward and act upon their environments which in turn respond and shape the organism. The circuit is a space of mutual and coconstitutive interactions --or better perhaps, an evolving space of Ôintra-actionsÕ 24 --which may well be triggered by something in the physical world, but this triggering would count for nothing if it were not already anticipated by an orientation of the organism which must first of all be equipped to notice it, and importantly, have an interest in it, for example, as something that might be ingested. The interactions between organisms and environments, therefore, are targeted interactions, and this is how meaning comes into the picture. Thus understood, the existence of an organism is not Ôa punctual correspondence between the present milieu and the action of the organismÕ (Merleau-Ponty, 2003: 192) . If behaviour is understood from moment to moment, we lose track of its meaning. That a behaviour is ÔmeaningfulÕ means that it forms part of a larger whole:
Each part of the situation acts only as part of a whole situation; no element of action has a separate utility in fact. Between the situation and the movement of the animal, there is a relation of meaning which is what the expression Umwelt conveys. The Umwelt is the world implied by the movement of the animal, and that regulates the animalÕs movements by its own structure. (Merleau-Ponty, 2003: 175) Forthcoming in Theory, Culture and Society
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As is clearly seen in this quotation, meaningful behaviour implies a capacity for movement on the part of the organism or animal, as it is in movement that the targeting of the environment by the organism is manifested. Merleau-Ponty takes this further and makes movement an indispensable ingredient in his new ontology by conceiving it as a prerequisite for the perceiving bodyÕs expressive and revealing capacity.
Movement and Body Schema
According to UexkŸll, the movement of the organism as it interacts with its environment is crucial to the development of physiological features of the organism, such as its musculo-skeletal structure and its nervous system 25 , which precisely highlights the bodyÕs function as a dynamic integrator. In analogy with the nervous system of the animal as conceived by UexkŸll, the body schema is formed in the circuit between the living being and its environment, as it moves and interacts with things in the physical world. For Merleau-Ponty, the body schema is a Ôsystem of referencesÕ in terms of which action in an environment is ÔplannedÕ (at a pre-reflexive level), and also a relationship to external space which results in the body and the space in which it is set being one system (Merleau-Ponty, 2011: 129) . This is another instantiation of the body extending into the world and vice versa, forming a circuit; the body schema is not simply of the body. In this circuit between body and environment, the body schema is that through which there is symbolism and expression 28 already in the sensible world; and movement is that through which the circuit is engendered. But as the circuit is engendered, so too is an environment with particular dimensions. We turn to this next. given by Merleau-Ponty is that of the two hands touching each other, and the exchange between them as they alternate between touching and touched. Flesh is that which allows for the reversibility of one hand to touch in one moment and to be touched in the next. The experience as toucher is defined not as a positivity, but rather in terms of a productive negativity of that The reversibility of toucher and touched is possible because there is a gap between them (the experiences of touching and of being touched do not completely coincide), a gap which is both temporal and spatial, which holds them apart as experiences, but which also allows for a differentiation between them. This means that touching and touched are not defined as experiences in and of themselves, but only in their divergence from each other. The differentiation therefore is not arbitrary, but conditioned by that from which it differs: it is a divergence or a splitting off from what is already there. Merleau-Ponty refers to this process as ÔŽcartÕ 29 . Merleau-Ponty also conceives of this divergence in terms of a dynamic figure-ground relationship. The gradual taking-shape of a figure against a background is for Merleau-Ponty a basic meaningful structure whose dynamic is repeated at all levels. This is why, in The Visible and the Invisible, he refers to the figure-ground dynamic as a Ôkey to the problem of the mindÕ (1968: 192 Productive negativity, reversibility and the Žcart, and the interlacing of body schemas are all ways through which the dimensions of the lived interworld are engendered, which make it livable as having specific possibilities of spatiality and temporality, with specific possibilities of behaviours and comportments. It is against the background of these concepts that the notion of the measuring body must be placed. The measuring body is the instantiation of flesh as formative medium for which and through which there is a lived interworld with specific dimensions; it is the being that enters into a circuit with the environment and fellow beings, as a body schema intertwining and overlapping with other body schemas, as a dynamic reversibility instituting specific dimensions and styles of behaviour recognisable by others.
Dimensions
As we have seen, embodied being is expressive in the sense that there is a carnal communicability to its behaviours. However, it is also expressive in another sense, relating to an inventive aspect at the heart of the bodyÕs functioning --the capacity to institute new phenomena, to open new dimensions and hence to displace the horizons of the established.
Productive negativity is the inventive principle at work in this ongoing dynamic process of 2011: 45) . It makes room, in other words, for a symbolism 33 that is already at work in the sensible world, and whose differentiating figure-ground dynamic is repeated at other levels.
Symbolisms and Tools as Measures of Being
In this section we draw together the different concepts that delineate Merleau-PontyÕs ontological project, which emphasises the expansive dynamic of flesh. We carry this expansion further by recasting symbolisms and tools as measuring agencies in their own right (ÔmeasuringÕ here taken in Merleau-PontyÕs ontological meaning), which, when injected into perceptual circuits, take on ontological import.
Merleau-PontyÕs suggestion that there is a symbolism of the sensible world is radical, since it implies that there is a Ôuniversality of sensationÕ (2003: 78) 34 . However, as it is used here, ÔuniversalityÕ takes on a new meaning that is captured with Merleau-PontyÕs notion of ÔstyleÕ of being. As soon as there is a style of being, there is a way of doing or being, among other ways.
Styles can be particular and individual; but they also have generality in the sense of regularities or patterns that can be recognised by others, and even taken up by others, and Ômade their ownÕ.
There is also generality in the sense that styles of being anticipate possible situations, something itself is both bodily and conceptual or general, just as language is both material and signifying.
As Merleau-Ponty writes: ÔAn organ of the moving senses (the eye, the hand) is already a language because it is an interrogation (movement) and a response [É], speaking and understandingÕ (2003: 211) . In this way Merleau-PontyÕs idea of an operative and carnal universality, makes room for new notions of agency and materiality, which find their roots on neither side of the nature-culture divide but precisely at the junction or crossing-over of physis and logos (2003: 199) . Thus understood, the Ômost difficult pointÕ is no longer framed in terms of passing from one world (sensible) to the other (intelligible); rather, the intelligible world installs itself in the sensible world, and, by so doing, displaces its horizons. What we have to do with is a Ôsurpassing that does not leave its field of originÕ (1968: 153) . Reciprocally this means that the meanings and formalisations of the intelligible world also need to be understood are not something that one looks at Ôas one looks at a thing, fixing it in its placeÕ; rather than seeing it, one sees Ôaccording to, or with itÕ (1993c: 126). There is, in other words a ÔlogosÕ of painting, an operative and carnal universality, which Merleau-Ponty, in his essays on painting (1993a, 1993b, 1993c) never be reduced to these.
As we have seen, the notion of the measuring body implies that the interaction of organisms and their environments gives rise to specific dimensions. A point that Merleau-Ponty does not fully develop, however, is that once the ontological force of symbolisms and tools is fully acknowledged, the environments opened are not one-dimensional but ÔmultidimensionalÕ --in the sense that, depending on symbolism and tool in question, they are specified in multiple all the dimensions of the worldÕ. As we have already noted, this is not a static point of reference, since the body schema continues to be modified and transformed. As we have also noted, the body schema institutes a type or style of organisation 37 .
The measuring body further develops these ideas in a direction that accentuates the decentring of the perceiving body as well as the relative autonomy of symbolisms and tools.
Certainly, Merleau-PontyÕs notion of body schema is already decentred, in at least three respects:
First, in that it is not of the subject (rather, it is the formative medium of subject and object), second, in that it is not of the body (it extends into the environment as much as the environment Haraway (1988) famously puts it. Rather, the point we want to make here is that the dualist notions of subjectivity and objectivity fall away together with the possibility of seeing subjects and objects as separately and independently constituted. The upshot of the approach we propose is that the measuring body conditions what it means to be an observer or observed in that specific apparatus. On this conception, agency is shifted from the observer to the distributed measuring body. This is in line with recent debates concerning agency that have argued that agency should not be limited to human observers (Pickering 1995 , Latour 2005 , Barad, 2007 . However, the measuring body differs from the approaches just referred to in that agency is phenomenologically reframed in terms of an opening of dimensions. On the proposed approach, the measuring body both has agency, through its being a mode of opening, but also specifies agency in its particular distributed system. It is a distributed system of intertwined agencies of observation, which, in accordance with Merleau-PontyÕs notion of flesh, operates through a generative figure-ground dynamic that configures the space of observation.
As distributed interrogating systems, measuring bodies involve displaced agencies of observation and measurement where the symbolic or instrumental set-ups take on the role as coordinating standards that amplify, guide, and align vision.
As a conceptual tool, the measuring body contributes to the ongoing theoretical articulation and empirical exploration of embodied and technologically mediated knowledge and being. It resonates with current postphenomenological approaches to the philosophy of technology, such as those of Don Ihde (2002) and Peter-Paul Verbeek (2005) , who decentre . The measuring body also resonates with the concerns of contemporary posthumanist approaches (Barad, 2007; Braidotti 2013) , due to the way that it emphasises that no perceiver is at the centre of their own perception, and in this it breaks with a certain interpretation of phenomenology. Moreover, like the performative and multiple bodies theorised by many in science and technology studies, notably by Annemarie Mol (2002) , the measuring body is multiple. Once again, though, we reframe this phenomenologically, arguing that the measuring body opens onto multi-dimensioned worlds.
The notion of the measuring body understood as a distributed system consisting of intertwined agencies of observation ontologically reframes scientific vision, and this has many further implications for our understanding of science. We conclude this article by pointing to one such implication, which concerns the very notion of measurement 39 . It may seem that what we have been saying about measuring has little to do with actual measuring as practiced in science, since in the approach presented here measuring is used in a much more general sense as the dimensioning of worlds, the very armature of being. However, what we argue is that measuring practices in scientific contexts are continuous with this sense of measuring; in fact, they are embedded in and made possible by it. As specific instances of measuring bodies, they enact the same dynamic but in highly particular ways and in more controlled settings. This also means that, contrary to the rhetoric of objectivity that surrounds them, there is a qualitative side to quantitative methods that cannot be ignored. For example, the computational approaches that are currently emerging in fields such as biology use a rhetoric of greater precision and predictiveness 40 . The point that scientific phenomena do not exist independently of measurement has been made by others: including notably Hacking (1983) , Barad (2007) , and Chang (2012) . The difference in arriving at these points through grappling with Merleau-PontyÕs thinking, is first, the consideration of measurement and phenomena as mutually and reciprocally caught up in circuits of intertwinement with technologies, symbolisms and bodies, and second, the way that agency is framed in terms of opening of dimensions. In the proposed approach, scientific measurement practices enact measurement as engaged operations, that is, not as operations that intervene in a domain from the outside, but as operations that act from the middle of things, carving out the axes and dimensions of the domain under investigation.
